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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade, there has been an increase in the amount of global terrorism incidents. 
There has also been an increase in the amount of organizations that commit these acts of terror. 
Specifically, the attacks seem to have increased drastically since 2010 because the year signifies 
the beginning of the downfall of Osama bin Laden, leader of al-Qaeda at the time. The current 
study explores and analyzes the pattern of non-U.S. global terrorism between 2010 and 2016. 
Between the timeframe, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began to gain tremendous 
ground and territory globally and would later go on to be described as the new form of al-Qaeda 
by many scholars in the field of terrorism. Eventually, the terror organization would start to 
decline, but the understanding of global terrorism during that timeframe is essential to this study 
because of the amount of horror and fear witnessed throughout the world during those years. The 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by START is used due to its information of all the terrorism 
incidents that occurred between 2010 and 2016. The variables of interest are the sheer number of 
attacks between the years specified, the lethality of the attacks, the geographic region such as 
where they occurred, and which organization carried out the attack in that specific nation. 
Through a univarite analysis and descriptive statistics, the data presents the pattern of global 
terrorism from 2010 to 2016 and explains whether there are key trends that existed during that 
time period.  
Keywords: global terrorism, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS, al-Qaeda, Osama bin 
Laden, Islamic-extremism, right-wing terrorism, left-wing terrorism, global terrorism database 
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Introduction: 
Terrorism has drastically changed since “Le Terreur” during the French Revolution. 
Whereas terror then was carried out by the state, now terrorism exists in many forms of non-state 
actors. These include left-wing, right-wing, extremist, Islamist, and lone-actor terrorism. 
Internationally, individuals are recruited by organizations to carry out lone-actor attacks. The 
organizations recruiting individuals into lone-actor attacks are mainly Islamist-extremist 
organizations that are based globally. These Islamist-extremist groups seek to cause havoc and 
destroy governments. Many of the terrorist organizations have many local branches that operate 
under a larger umbrella. Major groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have 
regional groups in Libya and Yemen that were created after its inception. The root of terror today 
is caused by global terrorism. The understanding of global terrorism is essential to study because 
of its importance in the world. 
 This study will examine the pattern of non-U.S. global terrorist violence from 2010 to 
2016. The reason this timeframe is chosen is because it begins with the death of Osama bin 
Laden, continues through the creation of ISIS, and ends with the decline of ISIS. Major wars 
such as Afghanistan and Iraq between state-actors and terrorist actors in the Middle East began 
to wind down during this period, but the rise of ISIS and the Syrian civil war may have increased 
the amount of terrorism during the period. Though there have been reports and studies conducted 
in regards to the patterns of terrorism internationally, they do not, however, include some key 
historical moments that helped shape and advance terrorism for many years to come (Miller, 
2018; Jenson, 2018; Smarick, 2018; and LaFree, 2018). Some discuss only ISIS attacks, while 
others discuss attacks on a yearly basis. A study such as this, as far as one can tell from open 
sources, has not been implemented for global terror. The goal of this study is to describe and
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analyze terror attacks, specifically within the timeframe chosen, to be able to uncover the nature 
of global terrorism.  
 Even though Islamist terrorism is prominent globally, some cross-sectional terrorist 
groups will be used that are non-Muslim to see whether a particular form of terrorism has 
increased due to an increase from Islamist-extremist terrorism. Additionally, there will be a 
discussion of the forms of terror that existed from 2010 to 2016, ranging from Middle Eastern 
terrorism to affiliates of al-Qaeda and ISIS to forms of left-wing terrorism. This accounts for 
every possible organization that might be presented after a data analysis is conducted.  
Mixed methodology will be used and will also include univariate analysis to answer the 
overall research question:  
What is the pattern of non-U.S. global terrorism between 2010 and 2016? 
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START) is an excellent source that lists and describes terrorism incidents throughout the world 
and will allow a comprehensive analysis of the research question. The variables of interest in this 
study will be the sheer number of attacks between the years specified, the lethality of the attacks, 
the geographic region where they occurred, and which organization carried out the attack in that 
specific nation.  
          Terrorism is a major issue that is continuing to be faced by governments and citizens. It is 
being combatted everyday by the military. The topic needs to be continuously studied because it 
can drastically change on any given day whether in form, in type, or in the creation of a new 
organization. Most people are asking more about one organization or a region such as al-Qaeda 
in Libya or ISIS in Yemen. This study aims to gather a snapshot based on the information 
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gathered from the database of interest in hopes of discovering whether these historical moments 
considered led to the increase and/or decrease of global terrorism.   
Literature Review: 
Rise of ISIS and other Middle Eastern Terrorism  
There is much that we can understand in the rise of ISIS by understanding the conflict 
between the Shia and the Sunni- the two rival branches of Islam. The conflict between both 
branches has been ongoing for 1,400 years and started with the death of the prophet Mohammed 
in the year 632 when he failed to announce a successor (Hall, 2016). The Sunni’s believed that 
the Prophet’s trusted friend Abu Bakr should be his successor while the Shia believed that the 
role belonged to Mohammed’s cousin Ali. The divide between the Sunni and Shia led to each of 
the branches creating their own unique cultures and doctrines, although Shia and Sunnis share 
the same core orientations, such as the belief that Islam is the complete system of truth and 
religion (Moaddel & Karabenick, 2018, p. 2). However, Sunni’s are largely focused on the 
power of God in the physical world whereas the Shia seek the rewards of the afterlife (Hall, 
2016). 
Although both branches were once a cohesive form of Islam, the current divide between 
the Sunni and Shia shapes the ideologies of terrorist organizations. Shia terrorist organizations 
feature large campaigns against a state and include organizational objectives (Lynch, 2008). 
Sunni extremists rely on the support from communities in facilitating their terrorist activities. 
Additionally, Sunni terrorist groups are more prone to kill those abducted while Shia extremists 
abduct civilians to barter them. The history between both branches have drastically altered 
Islamic terrorism to feature different forms of Islamic-extremism and it is important to note that 
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a  vast majority of the Muslim population in the world are Sunni (Hall, 2016) which explains 
why a majority of Islamic-extremist organizations bear Sunni ideologies.  
Given the rich history of Islam, the earliest form of Islamic terrorism that paved the way 
for the rise of ISIS was al-Qaeda which was formed in 1988 by Osama bin Laden (al Qaeda, 
n.d). Bin Laden had just finished fighting the Soviet Army from 1979 to 1988 in Afghanistan and 
wanted to take the concept of jihad (holy war) elsewhere to liberate other occupied Muslim 
lands. Many of his followers had been trained, military equipped, and funded by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) when they backed Afghanistan against the Soviets (al Qaeda, n.d). 
Al-Qaeda’s main ideology was the opposition of western influences and regarded them as 
“unIslamic” (MI5, n.d). It claimed that democracy is a rival religion and that the only acceptable 
form of government is an Islamic Caliphate, although the organization did not define what the 
Caliphate that they advocated for represented. 
After the creation of al-Qaeda, bin Laden met Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999 who had 
set up his own terrorist organization of Jama'at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (JTWJ) in Jordan in 1999 
(Zelin, 2014, p. 1). Before the groups formed a marriage of convenience in 2004, the U.S. 
invaded Iraq due to the apparent belief that the country’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, was in the 
process of building weapons of mass destruction (History.com Editors, 2009). bin Laden wanted 
to own the Iraqi jihad and remain relevant in the United States and in 2004, al-Zarqawi pledged 
baya (religious oath of allegiance) to bin Laden which would set up al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and 
the insurgency that would follow suit (Zelin, 2014, p. 3). 
Once AQI planted its roots in Iraq, al-Zarqawi would widen the gap between the Sunnis 
and Shia that had already existed (Holahan, 2015). Al-Zarqawi’s goal was to ignite an anti-U.S. 
insurgency and create a civil war in Iraq. During his reign as AQI’s leader, his organization 
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targeted symbols of western corruption such as liquor stores and pornographic theaters which 
exemplified al-Qaeda’s views against western influences (Sprusansky, 2016). Although al-
Zarqawi was proving himself as a ruthless leader who enhanced his credentials while carrying 
out acts of terror in Iraq, bin Laden viewed him as too extreme and refused to award him a 
prominent role within the al-Qaeda organization (Sprusansky, 2016). Al-Zarqawi was killed in 
2006 by a U.S. drone strike (Youssef, 2006). 
After the death of al-Zarqawi, AQI re-branded and became the Islamic State if Iraq (ISI) 
through the leadership of al-Zarqawi’s successor Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi 
envisioned a huge swarm of territory which stretched across three continents. The organization 
was supported by many of Iraq’s minority Sunni population. He eventually capitalized on the 
U.S troop withdrawal in 2011 from Iraq (Holahan, 2015) which would later allow Baghdadi to 
exploit the benefits of the Arab Spring; most notably the Syrian Civil War.   
The role of the Syrian Civil war is a key factor in shaping ISI which would eventually 
become ISIS. The war began in 2011 and was inspired by the Arab Spring which began in 
Tunisia a few months prior and shook several Arab regimes (Rabinovich, 2018, p. 45). The core 
of the war was centered on the corrupt and dictatorial regime of President Bashar al-Asad. Under 
President al-Asad’s regime, Syria’s relationship with Iran was transformed into an alliance of 
dependency due to the threat of the rebels and ISI in Syria. President al-Asad stepped aside and 
let ISI combat the rebels themselves. Al-Baghdadi and his followers proved themselves quickly 
as their fighters were effective in combatting the rebels and they gained recruits and land within 
Syria and Iraq as a result (Holahan, 2015).   
The ISI were successful due to the acquiring of large amounts of weapons that had 
originally been supplied by the U.S to the Iraqi military during the war (Welch, 2014). President 
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al-Asad’s plan of having the ISI fight the rebels backfired when they began attacking the 
government forces of Syria. ISI eventually obliterated the Syrian-Iraqi border (Rabinovich, 2018, 
p. 47). In 2013, al-Baghdadi announced that he was extending ISI into Syria and renamed the 
organization the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Zelin, 2014, p. 4). In 2014, the group 
captured Fallujah (Holahan, 2015). The event led to the disaffiliation with the declaration of al-
Baghdadi as the caliphate and ISIS in a few mere years accomplished more tangible results than 
al-Qaeda managed in two decades (Holbrook, 2015, p. 93-94). 
The organizations that are most prominent in the Middle East are al-Qaeda and ISIS. The 
majority of attacks are shared between the two, but their ideologies are different (Braniff, 2015). 
Al-Qaeda’s phased approach to reestablishing the caliphate begins with awakening the masses, 
continues with the management of barbarism, and ends with the reestablishment (Braniff, 2015). 
ISIS on the other hand seeks to destabilize tyrants and get stronger in order to reestablish the 
caliphate. Al-Zawahiri, the new leader of al-Qaeda and successor of bin Laden after his death in 
2011, has argued that the principle difference between both organizations is their approaches to 
jihad and that al-Qaeda is focused on the U.S. and its allies rather than “peripheral battles” 
(Holbrook, 2015, p. 95). The main difference between the two, however, is how al-Qaeda has 
never established a caliphate and controlled territory as ISIS has done through the turmoil of 
Syria. Despite the differences between both organizations in the Middle East, ISIS is waging war 
against a near enemy such as the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East (Hassan, 2016, p. 
768). 
Despite al-Qaeda and ISIS being the most prominent in the Middle East, there are other 
umbrella organizations and groups present within the region. Some, but not all, of al-Qaeda’s 
umbrella organizations and affiliates operate within the Middle East. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
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Peninsula (AQAP), formed in 2009, operated first out of Saudi Arabia and then Yemen 
(Mendelsohn, 2016, p. 140). The organization seeks to attack U.S. and western interests in 
Yemen and destabilize the Yemeni government (Rollins, 2011, p. 319-20). The former leader of 
AQAP, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, had close ties to the original leadership that existed within al-Qaeda 
(Humud, Arieff, Ploch Blanchard, Blanchard, Sharp, & Katzman, 2014, p. 41). Additionally, 
ISIS has gained a foothold in Yemen and in 2014 established The Islamic State in Yemen (Kis- 
Benedek, 2017, p. 6). The group has not been established as AQAP, but the Islamic State of 
Yemen has committed a few bombings and is composed of a few defectors from AQAP and 
other militants in the area.  
Besides the AQAP and the Islamic State in Yemen, the Middle East is home to the 
organization of Jabhat al-Nusra which was established in Syria in 2011 (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 
42). The organization trained in al-Qaeda training camps and developed significant military 
capabilities (Anzalone, 2016). Al-Nusra proved themselves as valuable assets in the war against 
the Syrian government and was at the center of political debates by external actors. Al-Baghdadi 
ignored al-Zawahiri’s claims of establishing al-Nusra as their official Syrian affiliate, and tried to 
recruit the organization into ISIS (Anzalone, 2016).  Despite al-Baghdadi’s attempts of 
incorporating the group as one of ISIS’ affiliates, al-Nusra proclaimed allegiance to al-Qaeda and 
this was due to not being consulted when al-Baghdadi announced the expansion of then ISI into 
Syria (Simonelli, 2014, p. 2). 
Aside from al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their umbrella organizations, there are other groups 
residing in the Middle East such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Hamas. It is important to 
note that the MB helped establish some of the prominent terror organizations that the world sees 
today such as al-Qaeda and ISIS (Farahat, 2017). In 2009, five MB leaders were charged with 
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providing material support to Hamas which is their Palestinian branch (Farahat, 2017). Hamas’ 
sole purpose is to carry out attacks to cripple Israel and establish a state of Palestine with 
Jerusalem being its capital. The organization operates out of the Gaza strip and since the Israeli 
pullout of soldiers within the region in 2005, the group has constantly carried out attacks against 
the state of Israel (The airbrushing, 2014). The organization has no interest in peace with Israel 
and has largely abandoned civil governance. 
Likewise, the al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades also exist in the Palestinian region and have 
committed attacks together with Hamas (Gadalla, 2014). There is as well evidence that Ansar 
Bayt al-Maqdis originated in Gaza and later conducted attacks in Egypt before pledging 
allegiance to ISIS and becoming their main organization in the Sinai Peninsula (Ansar Bayt, 
2014). Since the transfer of the -Aqsa Martyr Brigades into Egypt, ISIS has formed a new 
organization, Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade in 2015, to continue their operations in the Gaza strip 
(Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, n.d).  
Going beyond Hamas and the MB, Hezbollah have also been active in Lebanon. The 
organization rose to power from the Parliament elections in 2000 and the first role of the group 
has been to commit terror attacks in the surrounding Arab countries (Al-Jayallah, 2018). While 
in general Hezbollah operates within the border of Lebanon and Israel, there has been a case 
where they fought in the Syrian Civil war as President al-Asad’s forces were disintegrating 
(Rabinovich, 2018, p. 45). The organization attacked a few villages that were controlled by the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA) who stated that they do not recognize political law in Syria and started 
combatting al-Asad’s forces (Hassan, 2013). Apart from fighting Hezbollah, the FSA have also 
been fighting Jaish al-Islam, who undermined the FSA, and have had many groups merge into 
what is now known as the Army of Islam (Hassan, 2013). 
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The rise of ISIS has been attributed to many factors such as the US invasion and 
occupation of Iraq, the torture and discrimination against Iraqi Sunnis by the government, and 
the Shia-dominated government of Syria (Hassan, 2016, p. 768). ISIS and the caliphate were 
established through the toxic combination of the Syrian Civil war, corruption of the government, 
and a divide between the existing communities (Holahan, 2015). The rise of ISIS, therefore, is 
not related to religion and territorial conquests but rather due to the failure of the reconciliation 
between the Shia and Sunnis that exists for centuries and the politics in Iraq and Syria. 
 
Global Affiliates of al-Qaeda and ISIS 
 Even though al-Qaeda and ISIS are the two most significant Islamic-extremist 
organizations that exist, there are many branches of both organizations theologies that exist 
through the world. In Africa, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) was 
established in 1999 (Salafist Group, n.d). The group eventually integrated itself with al-Qaeda 
which was announced by then deputy al-Zawahiri in 2006 (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 36) and 
became Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2008 (Gomez, 2010, p. 11). AQIM operate 
in Algeria, Mali, and Niger. Al Murabitoun, which formed in 2013 and swore allegiance to al-
Qaeda in 2015, is a splinter cell of AQIM and operates in in the same regions. The faction of 
Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia has not sworn allegiance to al-Qaeda, but the group is ideologically 
allied to AQIM (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 49).  
 Al-Qaeda’s most successful affiliate operates in Africa as well. Al-Shabaab, which 
formed in 2004, has worked closely with al-Qaeda in the past (Rollins, 2011, p. 327). The 
organization has evolved out of the militant wing of Somalia’s court and has been religiously 
driven in uniting the inhabited areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia under an Islamic 
caliphate (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 38). The group racked up immense victories and controlled 
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many areas in the region. (Hansen, 2013, p. 146). Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 
2012 (BBC, 2017), but has since flirted with the idea of associating itself with ISIS (Kis- 
Benedek, 2017, p. 6). 
 Since the establishment of the caliphate, ISIS has been gaining ground in Africa by 
creating organizations and recruiting those who have been present within the region. ISIS has 
used the term wilayah (state/province) as their branding for their provinces (Blanchard & 
Humud, 2017, p. 20). The Islamic State in Egypt, formally known as Ansar Bayt al Maqdis and 
has already been discussed, pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi in 2014 (Byman, 2017). ISIS 
established the Islamic State in Libya which includes Ansar al Sharia (Libya) formed in 2011 
(Wehrey & Alrababa’h, 2015). Ansar al Sharia wants to establish a state which adopts sharia law 
rather than man-made laws (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 48). The group does not face strong 
government opposition (Byman, 2017).  
 A well-established organization that existed prior to ISIS involvement in Africa is Boko 
Haram which translates into “western education is forbidden” (Blanchard & Humud, 2017, p. 
22). The group formed in 2002 (CNN Library, 2018) and is one of the deadliest besides al-Qaeda 
and ISIS (Humud et. al, 2014, p. 44). Leaders of the organization have called upon civilians and 
militants to rise against authority in order to establish a caliphate in Nigeria. The West African 
province (The Islamic State in Nigeria) was established in 2011 (Lovelace, 2016) and Boko 
Haram swore allegiance to al-Baghdadi in 2015 (Lynch, 2015, p. 91). Aside from West Africa, 
ISIS has made camp in Algeria which was established in 2013, but has not been as successful as 
the campaigns carried out in West Africa (Islamic State Algeria, n.d).  
 Unlike Africa, al-Qaeda’s influence and affiliates in Asia seems stagnant. An 
organization that has aligned itself with al-Qaeda in recent years has been Tehrik-e Taliban 
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Pakistan (TTP) established in 2007 (Currently listed entities, 2018). It is unknown whether the 
organization has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. Harakat-ul Jihad Islami, formed in 1980 and 
based in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh (Sharma & Behera, 2014, p. 195), has also been 
closely aligned with al-Qaeda (Rollins, 2011, p. 316), but it is unknown if the group have 
pledged their allegiance to the organization. The last form of influence in Asia that al-Qaeda has 
created is al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent established in 2014 (AQIS, n.d). The creation of 
the organization was a response to the ISIS challenge faced in South Asia (Lynch, 2015, p. 96). 
 ISIS has gained in the region of Asia since its establishment and has even attracted 
former al-Qaeda affiliated factions. Wilayat Qawqas was established in 2014 (Vatchagaev, 2015) 
when al-Qaeda's Islamic Emirates of the Caucasus pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi 
(Gunaratna, 2016, p. 135). The four minor jihadist groups based in Dagestan, Russia and the 
Caucasus declared themselves as supporters of al-Baghdadi (Lynch, 2015, p. 91). Not far from 
the Caucasus Province exists the Khorasan Province in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 
organization was previously known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which was 
formed in 1998 (Rashid, 2002), but has since declared its support for ISIS in 2014 (Lynch, 2015, 
p. 91).  
 There has as well been a drastic surge of ISIS in the Philippines with multiple groups 
pledging baya to al-Baghdadi. The Philippines Province of ISIS was formed in 2014 when the 
organization of Abu Sayyaf pledged loyalty to ISIS (Ressa, 2014) The Bangsamoro Islamic 
Freedom Movement (BIFF) has been one of the most active in the Philippines and was formed in 
2008 (BIFF, n.d). The group pledged loyalty to al-Baghdadi and have been committing acts of 
terror in the name of ISIS in the Philippines ever since (The Economist, 2015). The Maute Group 
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in the Philippines formed in 2012 and pledged in 2015 (Maute Group, n.d). Ansar Al-Khilafa 
formed in 2014 and pledged in the same year (AKP, n.d).  
 Perhaps the largest organization that exists in the region of the Philippians and Indonesia 
is Jemaah Islamiya (JI) which was established in 1993 (JI, n.d). The group previously saw 
themselves as Indonesia's al-Qaeda (Rollins, 2011, p. 329). The members and supporters of JI 
share similar ideologies and objectives as al-Qaeda and ISIS (Singh, 2017, p. 7). Although JI had 
been closely aligned to al-Qaeda, the group pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi in 2014 (JI, n.d). 
The organizations of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), formed in 2010 (Roggio, 2016), and 
Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (Wilkinson, 2018), formed in 2015, have as well pledged loyalty to al-
Baghdadi.  
 Despite Africa and Asia being overpopulated with organizations, Europe has not had the 
same experience. Instead, Europe has experienced a surge of lone-actor attacks and al-
Qaeda/ISIS inspired attacks. One of the only known organizations that operate in Europe is the 
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group which was established in 1990 and is an affiliate of al-
Qaeda (GICM, n.d). The group has been mainly focused on document forgery, gunrunning and 
drug trafficking, but many former members of the group operate on an independent basis (Jesus, 
2009). Some of the notorious bombings that have been linked to the group have been the 2004 
Madrid train bombings and the 2007 Casablanca bombings. There are numerous splinter cells 
across Europe that exist (Guidère, 2012, p. 230). Still, Europe has not been inundated with 
organizations as seen with Africa and Asia. There are as well no organizations affiliated with al-
Qaeda and ISIS in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).  
 The number of affiliated organizations is enormous, but there must be some reason as to 
why organizations choose to affiliate themselves with al-Qaeda and ISIS.  According to Singh 
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(2012), the motivations that influence organizations to affiliate and pledge loyalty to al-Qaeda is 
due to failure, finance, a safe haven, training, common defense, branding, and personal networks. 
For instance, the Taliban’s alliance with al-Qaeda is strengthened through the trade of finances 
and training territories provided by the groups (Bacon, 2018). Although the Taliban has not 
pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, cooperation between the organizations still exists to the current 
day. Likewise, those who join ISIS’ cause are motivated by their success, technology, ideologies, 
training, and finances (Jabbour, n.d). Basically, an organization goes through a cost and benefit 
analysis of what both ISIS and al-Qaeda has to offer and judging by the amount of organizations 
that have been affiliated with both organizations, the number has tremendously increased 
between 2010 and 2016. 
 
Forms of Left-Wing Terrorism 
 Regardless of right-wing and Islamic dominance of terrorism, left-wing terrorism still 
exists, although it is not once what it was during the 1960s and 1970s. In Asia, India experiences 
a vast majority of left-wing terrorism. The conflict originates from the Naxalite movements 
where an armed guerilla movement was launched from Naxalbari against the Indian state 
(Bhambhri, 2015, p. 15). Local terrorist/insurgent groups which include left-wing extremists 
have resorted back to terror attacks after failing to attract support from external factors 
(Subramaniam, 2012, p. 400–402). The current threat stems from the Communist Party of India 
(Tan, 2018, p. 161) and left-wing groups are active in both states that are of low and high 
socioeconomic status (Chowdhury, 2016, p. 89). The insurgency of left-wing terrorism in India 
was brought upon by the lopsided development in the tribal parts within the country which led to 
left-wing extremists targeting innocent civilians in pursuit of their stated objectives 
(Subramaniam, 2012, p. 399).  
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 Additionally, Europe has experienced a great amount of left-wing terrorism with some 
incidents coming from anarchist organizations. In Greece, a left-wing guerilla group claimed 
responsibility for conducting a gun attack on an Israeli embassy in Athens (Kitsantonis, 2015).  
Other organizations, such as anarchist groups and protesters, were responsible for damaging 60 
stores in Greece as well (Associated Press, 2017). The protest was sparked when an Athens court 
refused to suspend a sentencing of an individual who had ties to anarchist group. Dozens of 
youths participating in the protest were carrying hammers and metal bars while the police used 
tear gas to disperse the crowd (Greece, 2017). 
 One of the most prominent form of left-wing terrorism that still exists is the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) now known as the Provisional IRA. The Provisional IRA have 
repeatedly committed acts of violence and issued warnings to the police advising them to cease 
operations in certain areas of Ireland (The patriot, 2013). When warnings were ignored, the 
groups set two mortars in an area where police were investigating. The Provisional IRA has 
experienced splinter cells that broke off which were operating under a new unified structure (The 
patriot, 2013) and the original organizations has been quiescent since 1998. Despite the left-wing 
terror that is experienced in Europe, Ireland has continued to be the focus of attention due to it 
being home to one of the last forms of left-wing terror still in existence from the 20th century 
although the violence that has continued has been low-level and carried out by dissident groups 
that oppose peace. 
 The Middle East and Africa have had minimal interaction with extremist left-wing 
organizations. However, there has been an increase in political left-wing movements due to 
poverty and inequality continuing to be an issue in the area (Beresford, 2012, p. 880). It is as 
well important to note that left-wing organizations in the Middle East and Africa have rejected 
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Islamic groups and Islamist-led government. In Tunisia, the National Salvation Front (NSF), 
united for protests after the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi (Chronology Tunisia, 2014, p. 
148). Likewise, in Syria, he Democratic Union Party (PYD) expelled jihadi groups and has had 
clashes between Kurdish groups and Islamist militant groups (Chronology Syria, 2014, p. 144). 
The rejection of Islamic organizations by left-wing groups falls in line with the longstanding 
issue of right-wing vs. left-wing.  
 Unlike other regions, LAC has continued to struggle with a left-wing insurgency. In 
Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) was active, but has since been 
defeated and inactive since 2017. The material that made the group successful was that it thrived 
on the rivalries between other organizations in the area (Phillips, 2015, p. 65). Like the groups in 
Colombia, Peru has had their own experience with terror groups such as the Shining Path which, 
since its inception, have been accredited to many deaths in Peru (Shadle, 2013, p. 285). Although 
the region has had instances of terrorism through organizations such as the Shining Path and 
FARC, there has not been much media coverage of terrorism in LAC (Connell, 2004, p. vii). The 
same can be said for left-wing terrorism throughout the world as it is highly unreported on.  
Research Design: 
 The unit of analysis is terrorism incidents (n = 54,762). The data was acquired from the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) operated by the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) in Maryland. The GTD began in 2001 when 
researchers at the University of Maryland obtained a database that was originally collected by the 
Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) (START, 2018). The data collected from 1998 
through 2007 was collected retrospectively, while the data on more recent events has been 
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collected in real-time due to the benefits of media archives. The data is available to the public 
and START allows individuals to download the entire dataset off of their website.  
 Terrorist attacks, by the GTD, are defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force 
and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through 
fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START, 2018). The attack is considered into the database if it 
meets three attributes which are the incident must be intentional, entail some level of violence or 
threat of violence, and the perpetrators must be sub-national actors. Acts of state terrorism are 
not included. The number of incidents in the database are attributed to manual data collection 
strategies employed by the GTD team to increase the efficiency, accuracy, and completeness of 
the collection of attacks. The process starts with over one million media articles which are on 
any topic that are published daily worldwide. They are then analyzed by the GTD staff to a small 
subset of articles that describe terror attacks which are added to the database (START, 2018).  
The GTD also codes the attacks by criteria that individuals can choose to include or 
exclude. The criterions were established and applied to the incidents to assure the adherence of 
the broad definition of terrorism that exists in order to filter out cases that seem inappropriate to 
specific analytical interests that researchers have (START, 2018). Two of the three criteria must 
be present for the incident to be added to the database. The three criteria are: 
Criterion I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social 
goal.  
Criterion II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some 
other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.  
Criterion III: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. 
the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law 
(particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).  
 
For the purpose of this study, all three criteria will be included. Criterion I is essential to the 
analysis because this study wants the terrorism incident to be aimed at attaining political, 
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religious, and/or economic goals due to the objectives of ISIS and al-Qaeda. Criterion II is 
included due to both fear and recruitment purposes. Terrorist organizations want to reach an 
audience beyond the initial victims to spread psychological factors and change the minds of 
individuals to join the fight. Lastly, criterion III is included because it is important to be sure that 
the incidents are acts of terrorism and not acts of violence committed in warfare. Humanitarian 
law forbids attacks on civilians for its own sake in warfare. Terrorism makes such attacks its 
main purpose.  
 The analysis as well allows including ambiguous cases due to uncertainty whether or not 
an incident meets all of the criteria for inclusion as a GTD terrorist incident. Including 
ambiguous cases broadens the number of incidents that occur from 2010 to 2016. Lastly, 
unsuccessful attacks are not included in the unit of analysis. When discussing terror 
organizations, this design looks at attacks that were successfully committed by the groups and 
not those that were thwarted. By including unsuccessful attacks in this study, this will not 
explain how powerful and effective an organization was.  
Based on the timeframe, the incidents analyzed are from January 1st, 2010 to December 
31st, 2016. The GTD codes countries into regions and the regions of interest to this study that 
will be included in the analysis are: Australasia & Oceania, Central America & Caribbean, 
Central Asia, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East & North Africa, South America, South 
Asia, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Western Europe. The database as well assigns 
each incident a unique event ID which includes the year, month, day, and incident number of that 
specific day. For example: 201612310001.   
 Once the analysis is run, that data is categorized by the sheer number of attacks between 
the years specified, the lethality of the attacks such as the fatalities and wounded, the geographic 
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region such as where they occurred, and the organization that carried out the attack in that 
specific region. Each incident has a brief summary noting the “when, where, who, what, how, 
and why” (START, 2018). The GTD uses a standardized list of group names that have been 
established by the staff at START. Also, due to the number of independent sources that lists 
casualties, the most recent source is usually reflected by the GTD unless that source is of 
questionable validity.  
A univariate analysis is used to explore each variable in the data set created. After the 
analysis is conducted, descriptive statistics is used to describe and summarize the data. Due to 
the time constrictions of the current study, the organizations that committed the attacks are 
limited to the top 20 most successful groups. The most successful organizations are measured by 
the number of successful terror attacks the groups have carried out.  
Results: 
Number of Attacks 
 Table 1 presents the number of terror attacks between 2010 and 2016. Overall, between 
the years studied, the total number of successful incidents was 54,762 and unsuccessful was 
8,765. Whereas successful terror attacks in 2010 numbered 4,215, that number doubled by 2013. 
After the death of Osama bin Laden, the number of successful attacks increased from 4,274 in 
2011 to 6,108 in 2012 ,which was a 42.88% increase. The peak number of terror attacks occurred 
in 2014 which still remains an all-time high. Since 2014, terror attacks have been decreasing 
according to the findings. In 2016, the number of successful terror attacks was 9,100 which is a 
24% decrease since 2014.  
Unsuccessful terror attacks have seen a gradual increase between the years studied. In 
2010, it was reported that of the 4,639 attacks that occurred, 424 were unsuccessful. That number 
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doubled from 2011 to 2012 which is seen by a 91.42% increase. This might be due to the number 
of attacks committed in 2012 increasing from the previous year. Of the 11,192 attacks that 
occurred in 2016, 2,092 were unsuccessful. Unsuccessful terror attacks between the period have 
seen a 343.4% increase.  
 A majority of the successful terror attacks were conducted in the Middle East & North 
Africa region which saw 38.91% of attacks between 2010 and 2016 according to table 2.1. The 
number of attacks peaked at 5,019 in 2014. The data also presented that the runner-up behind the 
Middle East & North Africa for the amount of attacks between the timeframe was South Asia 
which saw 34.7% of attacks. Lastly, 12.74% of attacks were conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
All regions saw decreases in attacks after 2014 excluding Western Europe. Western Europe 
experienced a 70.8% increase in attacks from 2014 to 2015. 
 Table 2.2 illustrates the number of unsuccessful attacks by region between 2010 and 
2016. South Asia experienced the majority of unsuccessful terror attacks between the timeframe 
which was 41.24%. The Middle East & North Africa witnessed 34.6% of the total number of 
unsuccessful attacks. As with the trend of the total number of unsuccessful attacks increasing, the 
same is seen by region as most regions experienced an increase in unsuccessful attacks. Some 
regions such as South Asia and Western Europe did not, but this can be due to the amount of 
overall attacks conducted in the respective years.    
Lethality of Attacks 
 The lethality of civilians in terror attacks between 2010 and 2016 have shown an extreme 
increase. Table 3.1 depicts the total fatalities and wounded of civilians from successful attacks 
between the timeframe. In 2011, the number of civilian fatalities were 6,790 and wounded were 
13,282. After the death of Osama bin Laden, in 2012 the fatalities were 9,676, a 42.5% increase 
and the number of wounded were 21,404, a 61.15% increase. In 2014, the amount of fatalities 
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reached a record high which was 27,507. The record high for wounded was in 2015 which 
totaled 35,564. The total number between the timeframe of fatalities was 107,741 and wounded 
was 183,601.  
 Besides civilians who are killed or wounded by attacks, there have been many 
perpetrators who have been killed or wounded committing a successful attack. In 2010, a total of 
74 perpetrators were wounded and 411 were killed illustrated in table 4.1. Those numbers have 
severely increased over the years. In 2014, there were 5,995 perpetrator fatalities which was a 
156.97% increase from the previous year. In 2016, there were 1,178 perpetrators wounded, a 
9.95% decrease from 2015 and 4,537 perpetrator fatalities, a 21.95% decrease from the previous 
year. The total number of perpetrator fatalities of successful attacks between 2010 and 2016 was 
20,964 and wounded was 4,338.   
 There have also been civilians who were wounded or killed in unsuccessful attacks. 
According to the GTD, unsuccessful terror attacks are defined as attacks in which the objective 
of the attack is not completed. An example would be an attack that targetec a high ranking 
official by an explosive in which others are killed such as civilians or law enforcement officials 
but not the individual initially targeted. According to table 3.2, there have been a total of 3,688 
civilians wounded and 1,068 killed between 2010 and 2016 by unsuccessful attacks. In 2013, 
there were 764 civilians wounded which was a 209.31% increase from 2012. In 2015, 241 
civilians were killed. 
 Compared to the lethality of civilians in unsuccessful attacks, perpetrators have had the 
most fatalities in unsuccessful attacks.  In 2010, there were only 13 perpetrators wounded and 31 
fatalities as reported in table 4.2. In 2015, there was a 1,345.83% increase of perpetrators 
wounded from the previous year and a 494.24% increase in killed from 2014. In 2016, 437 were 
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wounded and 2,228 were killed. Between 2010 and 2016, the number of perpetrators wounded 
and killed has only continued to increase and the amount killed between the time period was 
4,313 and wounded was 888.  
 The highest number of civilian casualties from successful terror attacks came in the 
Middle East & North Africa region in 2014 as depicted in table 5.1. The number of civilian 
fatalities was 12,553 and overall, between 2010 and 2016, the Middle East & North Africa had 
46.53% of fatalities of successful attacks occur in the region. South Asia had 24.67% of fatalities 
occur in the region with a total of 26,579 and Sub-Saharan Africa had 23.84% with a total of 
25,686. Of the 107,741 fatalities from successful attacks, 102,398 occurred in the three regions. 
A trend that was also discovered in the data is while fatalities in Eastern Europe decreased, 
attacks in Western Europe increased towards 2016.  
 The data presented in table 5.2 on civilians wounded in successful terror attacks by 
region illustrates the same trend as fatalities. The top three regions where the most wounded 
occurred was in the Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In the 
Middle East & North Africa, a total of 55.63% of the wounded between the timeframe occurred 
in the region. Unlike fatalities, the highest number of wounded did not occur in 2014 for the 
Middle East & North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, 9,401 civilians were wounded in 
South Asia. In 2015, 20,620 civilians were wounded in the Middle East & North Africa and 
5,466 civilians were wounded in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 183,601 civilians wounded, 
170,700 were wounded in the three regions. Lastly, as the number of wounded in Eastern Europe 
decreased, the number of wounded in Western Europe increased.  
 Civilian fatalities of unsuccessful terror attacks mimic the same direction as successful 
terror attacks by region, but not the same high numbers of casualties. The highest number of 
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fatalities from unsuccessful attacks came in the Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa as shown in table 6.1. Of the 1,068 casualties, 986 occurred in the regions 
which is 92.32% of the overall total.  In 2015, 64 civilians were killed in the Middle East & 
North Africa, 78 were killed in South Asia, and 81 were killed in Sub-Saharan Africa which 
were the highest number of civilian casualties from unsuccessful attacks between 2010 and 2016.  
 Once again, as seen from fatalities of unsuccessful attacks, the Middle East & North 
Africa and South Asia saw the highest number of civilians wounded in unsuccessful terror 
attacks. As shown in table 6.2, in 2013, 331 civilians were wounded in the Middle East & North 
Africa while 338 were wounded in South Asia in 2015. Both regions accounted for 80.66% of 
civilians wounded between the time period. Sub-Saharan Africa was accountable for 10.71% of 
civilians wounded.  
 There have been many perpetrators who have committed terror attacks and have been 
killed in the process. Depicted in table 7.1 is the amount of perpetrator fatalities of successful 
terror attacks by region. In 2014, 2,191 perpetrators died committing a successful attack in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In 2015, 2,315 died in South Asia. And in 2015, 1,828 died in the Middle East & 
North Africa. Combined together, of the 20,964 perpetrator fatalities, 20,196 occurred in the 
three regions which accounted for 96.34% of the total. The most perpetrator fatalities overall 
between 2010 and 2016 occurred in South Asia which was 8,746, 41.72% of the total.  
South Asia has also seen the greatest number of perpetrators wounded in successful terror 
attacks which was 3,413 as seen in table 7.2. In 2015, 1,063 perpetrators were wounded in South 
Asia. Of the total 4,338 wounded, 78.68% perpetrators were wounded in South Asia. The Middle 
East & North Africa saw the second highest number of wounded perpetrators although in much 
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lesser amounts from South Asia. In 2015, 165 perpetrators were wounded with the total between 
2010 and 2016 amounting to 556, 12.82% of the total.  
The number of perpetrator fatalities of unsuccessful terror attacks heavily outweighs 
those of civilians. In table 8.1, 57.29% of perpetrator fatalities occurred in the Middle East & 
North Africa with the highest number occurring in 2016 at 1,502. The total number of 
perpetrator fatalities in the region was 2,471. In South Asia, the highest number of perpetrator 
fatalities was in 2016 which saw 647 killed. The total number of perpetrator fatalities in South 
Asia between the time period was 1,298, 30.10% of the total. Sub-Saharan Africa drew the third 
highest amount of perpetrator casualties at 10.48% of the total with the highest amount occurring 
in 2015 at 289 fatalities.    
 South Asia had the highest number of perpetrators wounded in unsuccessful terror attacks 
shown in table 8.2 which was 670, 75.45% of the total between 2010 and 2016. The highest 
number of wounded occurred in 2016 in which 332 perpetrators were wounded from 
unsuccessful terror attacks. The Middle East & North Africa saw a total of 179 perpetrators 
wounded and the highest number wounded came in 2016 at 94. This was 20.16% of the total. 
Every other region had relatively low numbers of perpetrators wounded.  
Terror Organizations  
 Of the 54,762 successful terror attacks between 2010 and 2016, 17,113 were committed 
by the top 20 most successful organizations shown in table 9. The organization that committed 
the most attacks within the timeframe was the Taliban which was 4,155 successful attacks. The 
highest number of successful attacks was 977 and occurred in 2015. The Taliban committed 
7.59% of the total amount of successful terror attacks. Nearing the Taliban’s numbers was ISIS 
with 3,649 successful attacks. ISIS attacks included attacks committed by AQI and ISI. The 
highest number of attacks committed was 1,048 in 2014 with a decrease followed in 2015 to 835 
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attacks and an increase in 2016 to 955 successful attacks. ISIS committed 6.66% of the total 
successful attacks between 2010 and 2016.  
Although most of the successful attacks were committed by Sunni Islamism 
organizations, there were a number of successful organizations that were left-wing. The 
Communist Party of India committed 1,119 of the successful terror attacks. In LAC, FARC and 
the National Liberation Army of Columbia (ELN) combined for 645 successful attacks. Overall, 
of the 20 successful terror organizations, 13,652 attacks were committed by Islamist 
organizations leaning to the right while 3,461 attacks were committed by left-wing/far-left 
organizations.  
Unlike the Taliban having the greatest number of attacks between 2010 and 2016, ISIS 
had the most civilian fatalities between the time period. The highest number of civilian fatalities 
occurred in 2016 and was 6,267 according to table 10.1. The total number of civilian fatalities in 
ISIS attacks was 20,322 which was 18.86% of the entire total between 2010 and 2016. Boko 
Haram had the second highest number of civilian fatalities which was 12,502, 11.6% of the total. 
The organization’s highest number of civilian fatalities was 4,863 in 2014. The Taliban’s highest 
number of fatalities was 2,161 in 2015 and the total between the time period was 9,692, which 
accounted for 8.9% of the entire total. Overall, Islamist organizations civilian fatalities accrued 
to 53,723 and left-wing organizations civilian fatalities accrued to 3,060 between 2010 and 2016. 
Altogether, all 20 terror organizations accounted for 52.58% of civilian fatalities. 
The number of civilians wounded by terror organizations showed similar results as those 
killed by terror attacks. According to table 10.2, ISIS attacks had the most civilians wounded 
with a total of 29,061 with the highest number occurring in 2016 at 7,599. The group’s civilians 
wounded accrued to 15.83% of the entire total. The Taliban’s civilians wounded was half of ISIS 
23 
 
being 14,522, 7.91% of the total. The highest number of civilians wounded was 3,354 in 2015. 
Behind the Taliban was Boko Haram which had 7,777 civilians wounded between the timeframe 
with the highest being 3,336 in 2015. Overall, the number of civilians wounded by Islamist 
organizations accrued to 67,571 and the number of civilians wounded by left-wing organizations 
accrued to 5,055 between 2010 and 2016. Altogether, all 20 terror organizations accounted for 
39.56% of civilians wounded.  
Discussion: 
 Since 2010, the amount of terror attacks has significantly increased. After the death of 
Osama bin Laden, terror attacks around the world have had an increase. As seen in the data, 2014 
had the record high of terror attacks and it comes as no surprise that this occurred when ISIS 
became an organization and split from al-Qaeda. Successful terror attacks have decreased 
towards 2016, but the amount of unsuccessful terror attacks through the years have increased 
suggesting that the policies that are in effect around the world make it more difficult for actors to 
commit successful terror attacks.  
 A majority of the successful terror attacks occurred in the Middle East & North Africa. 
This was suggested earlier as the regions are known to be home to some of the deadliest terror 
organizations. South Asia had the second highest of successful terror attacks occur in the region. 
This could be due to the proximity the area is from the Middle East & North Africa and because 
South Asia incorporates countries such as Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan to name a few. Other 
regions had relatively low numbers of successful attacks.  
Unlike the Middle East & North Africa having the most successful attacks, South Asia 
had the majority of unsuccessful attacks occur in the region between 2010 and 2016. Each region 
experienced increases in unsuccessful attacks throughout the years studied which, once again, 
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suggests that there must be some counterterrorism policies or sanctions in effect in each region 
that makes committing terror attacks much more difficult than in the past. South Asia and 
Western Europe did not have the same experiences, but this is most likely due to the fact that 
towards 2016, the amount of terror attacks that are actually being committed have shrinked.  
The lethality of civilians reveals that the death of Osama bin Laden had a severe effect on 
the fatalities and wounded tolls. After his death, fatalities increased by 42.5% in 2010 which 
raises the issue as to whether more terror organizations were able to rise due to his death. In 
2014, the amount of fatalities reached a record high, but is once again due to the rise of ISIS. In 
2015, however, the record high for wounded occurred which suggests that some terror 
organizations may have been more effective in wounding individuals in their attacks compared 
to the number of attacks in 2015.  
In unsuccessful terror attacks, there have been many civilians who have been casualties in 
a failed attempt to commit a terror attack. The data explains that individuals who are responsible 
for the attempts care nothing about those who get in the crosshairs and will do anything to see 
the attacks through. But this shows that it is not the case because the attacks were unsuccessful 
and this is probably due to outside measures such as law enforcement, the military, or the 
inexperience of the attacker to commit a successful terror attack.  
Besides civilian casualties, perpetrators themselves have died in the process of 
committing an attack. In successful terror attacks, perpetrators have not had the same level of 
deaths and wounded as civilians did but the statistics are still high. During the rise of ISIS in 
2014, there was a record high of perpetrators who were killed during a successful attack. The 
data suggests that perpetrators do not care whether they live or die when committing an attack 
and they subjectify themselves as suicide attackers. This can also be due to the level of training 
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that each individual obtains from their respective terror organizations. Terror organizations 
expand onto their followers that dying for a cause while committing an attack is a blessing and 
fulfilling.  
In unsuccessful attacks, however, most individuals who die or end up wounded are 
perpetrators. This could be due to a number of reasons, but some of the main ones would either 
be the state of mind of the individual or the lack of experience. If an individual is going through 
a psychotic and emotional breakdown that leads him to commit an attack, then the attack might 
not go as planned. Likewise, if the individual fails to grasp the knowledge provided by the 
organizations, then that attack will also not go according to plan. The number only continues to 
increase which shows that there once again are obstacles in place that stop perpetrators from 
committing the attacks. 
The region which had the greatest number of civilian fatalities and wounded from both 
successful and unsuccessful terror attacks was the Middle East & North Africa. Trailing closely 
behind were the regions of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. All three regions closely 
accounted for most of the overall fatalities and wounded from terror attacks. This is no surprise 
because of the amount of attacks that occur in the regions. A trend that was discovered is while 
fatalities in Eastern Europe decreased, fatalities in Western Europe increased towards 2016. This 
is due to the number of attacks in the regions. In Eastern Europe towards 2016, terror attacks 
have significantly decreased while in Western Europe they have increased. This raises an issue 
as to whether Eastern Europe has made it more difficult for individuals to commit attacks or 
individuals are being sent to and radicalized more in Western Europe to commit attacks. 
In the Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, the amount of 
perpetrator fatalities in successful attacks accounted for 96.34% of the total with South Asia 
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having the highest percentage of the three regions. South Asia as well had the most amount of 
perpetrator fatalities from unsuccessful attacks. Once again, this should come as no surprise 
because of the number of attacks witnessed and the many terrorist organizations which planted 
their seeds in the regions. The more amount of attacks, the more there is a chance that the 
perpetrator(s) will die in the commission of an attack. Some notable examples are the 2015 Paris 
attack in which ISIS gunman organized mass shootings and suicide bombings, the 2014 Kano 
bombing in which Boko Haram members organized bombings on a mosque, and the 2016 Berlin 
truck attack in which an ISIS member ran a truck through civilians in a heavily populated street. 
These perpetrators knew going into the attack that there was a high chance that some or all 
would be killed.  
The data revealed that the Middle East & North Africa had the highest number of 
perpetrator fatalities from unsuccessful attacks. It can be understood that South Asia had the 
highest number of perpetrators wounded from unsuccessful attacks, but this can be explained by 
individuals who are not directly trained by terror organizations, but rather radicalized. In the 
Middle East & North Africa, many of the attackers are somehow directly or indirectly trained. 
This can come in the form of an individual hearing about training received from an organization 
by a friend or directly being recruited into the organization. The fact that many perpetrator 
fatalities from unsuccessful attacks occur in the region suggests that either the organizations are 
not supplying sufficient enough of training or the region is once again making it more difficult to 
commit an attack. Since the Middle East & North Africa experience the most amount of attacks, 
it is safe to assume that governments in the region have made massive changes to policy 
throughout the years and this is seen from the amount of perpetrator fatalities in unsuccessful 
attacks in 2016.  
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The data displayed in the top 20 successful terror organizations reveals a high amount of 
information. Firstly, of the overall attacks, 31.3% were conducted by the organizations. 
Individuals might think that ISIS committed the most attacks throughout the years, but the data 
shows that the Taliban committed the most throughout the timeframe. The Taliban’s amount of 
attacks decreased towards 2016 compared to ISIS. When ISIS rose in 2014, they committed 
1,048 attacks. In 2015, the amount decreased to 835 successful attacks. And in 2016, they 
orchestrated 955 successful attacks. As heard by many news outlets and governments, these 
statistics don’t refer to a decline of ISIS although much of the land that they currently control has 
been lost due to military interference. 
ISIS has also held a strong lead above other organizations in the most civilian fatalities 
and wounded. In 2016, ISIS had their highest number of civilians killed. Overall, they were 
responsible for 18.86% of civilian deaths between 2010 and 2016. In comparison, Boko Haram 
and the Taliban did not have as high the amount of civilian fatalities, but combined, they still 
were responsible for 20.5% of civilian fatalities. ISIS almost nears the combined groups in death 
tolls and judging from the statistics in 2016, they do not seem to be slowing down. ISIS also had 
the greatest number of civilians wounded in which they accrued 15.83% of the entire total 
between 2010 and 2016. Once again, they saw the highest amount in 2016. As seen from the 
data, ISIS has not been declining going into 2016 and seem to be rapidly growing in number of 
attacks and casualties from those attacks. 
The data as well identified that a number of left-wing terror organizations still exist 
throughout the world. Of the 20 successful terror organizations, seven were left-wing armed 
political movements which seek to establish a communistic or Marxist government. The other 13 
organizations were Sunni Islamic which seek to establish systems based on their ideologies. 
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There were no Shia organizations and this can be due to the vast majority of the Muslim 
population being Sunni and not many Shia terror organizations exist.  
Sunni organizations had the greatest number of successful attacks, the greatest number of 
civilian fatalities, and the greatest number of civilians wounded compared to left-wing 
organizations. This can be due to a few reasons such as radicalization and “the following”. Left-
wing organizations do not radicalize and brainwash individuals like Islamist organizations do. 
Left-wing organizations have a main agenda through armed conflict such as war with opposing 
governments and do not have time to radicalize other individuals to come to their respective 
countries and join the fight. Islamist organizations have the entire world at their alter hence “the 
following” and commit attacks throughout the world unlike left-wing organizations. The groups 
can brainwash individuals at will to join their cause and commit attacks wherever the 
perpetrators want. The span of radicalization is a primary focus of Islamist right-wing terror 
groups and this explains the high number of attacks and civilian casualties.  
Limitations: 
 There were a few issues encountered when divulging into the data. Firstly, some of the 
attacks were coded into the wrong dates. For instance, an attack that was committed in 2014 had 
an event id that started with the year 2015. This error was encountered nine times and was fixed 
by placing the attacks into their respective years by the dates they were committed and not the 
event id. The second issue that occurred when looking at the attacks was that some attacks had 
no date for the day and was 0 such as an attack committed on March 0, 2013. This was the case 
for 79 incidents and was rectified by putting the attacks into the respective years they were 
committed. Third, many attacks had no reports of civilian and/or perpetrator fatalities and 
wounded. This presents a flaw in this study because there might be more individuals who are 
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killed and wounded by certain organizations which increases their dangerousness. Likewise, 
there might be more perpetrators who are killed or wounded committing an attack which 
expresses weaknesses in an organization’s training of the individual(s). 
 There were two errors encountered when observing all the organizations themselves and 
categorizing the top 20 successful organizations. First, many attacks had the organizations tab as 
unknown. This can mean two things such as an organization may have claimed an attack, but the 
GTD did not report it or there were no organizations that claimed the attack. This occurred in 
29,050 instances. Once again, this poses a flaw on the research because there might be attacks 
that were committed by the top 20 successful organizations which increases the threat and the 
dangerousness that they pose to the world. The second error encountered was that when looking 
at the top 20 successful organizations, many attacks were not committed by groups, but by 
individuals who were extremists and were categorized by the GTD under a group. For instance, 
some attacks that fell into the top 20 categories were committed by organizations such as 
Maoists, Houthi extremists, Fulani extremists, Muslim extremists, Palestinian extremists, and 
separatists. These are not organizations. Although organizations consist of individuals who are 
dubbed extremists, they respectively commit attack for one or a few purposes. The extremists 
who committed the attacks as mentioned above were not doing so out of an organizations’ 
purposes, but their own and so they were excluded from the top 20 successful organizations.  
Conclusion: 
 This study was conducted around the themes of the death of Osama bin Laden followed 
by the rise of ISIS to the decline of ISIS. The data revealed key elements to the timeframe 
studied. There were a few left-wing organizations that still exist today, but they did not measure 
up in dangerousness of Islamist right-wing organizations. Left-wing terrorism is slowly dying 
30 
 
and Islamic terrorism seems to be the new norm of terror. For example, after the death of Osama 
bin Laden in 2011, there were increases in attacks and civilian fatalities and wounded by Islamist 
organizations in 2012 and the statistics continued to grow in the coming years. It is still unclear 
whether other organizations feared to rise while Osama bin Laden was alive due to the 
repercussions there might be, but this can be implied from the data. The rise of ISIS was 
certainly a rise and not a decline up to 2016 because as the data presented, ISIS is in no shape or 
form declining and only rising. There may be a decrease in attacks and their lands may be 
liberated, but the number of civilian fatalities and wounded remain high. It is important to note 
that although ISIS has seen increases in attacks and lethality across the board, between 2010 and 
2016, the main al-Qaeda network and not an affiliate committed only one attack which was a 
kidnapping of an American woman in 2011 in South Asia and shows how the organization has 
been stagnant since the death of Osama bin Laden.  
 The rise of ISIS has now raised more concerns on the radicalization of individuals. The 
fact that the attacks still remain high for the organization implies that there are individuals all 
over the world who are radicalized to join the cause. Radicalization has always been an issue in 
terrorism due to propaganda and rising technology. Propaganda and exposure through 
technology poses an increased threat to individuals because agencies of countries might be able 
to stop a few organization’s propaganda videos, but not all. This then leads to policies revolving 
around individuals after they have been radicalized. Policies such as rehabilitation, offering 
employment benefits for those who return, and reintegration into society (EIP, n.d). This may 
have an effect, but much radicalization stems from psychological issues which cannot be fixed 
overnight.  
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 Although radicalization has its effects on terrorism, countries have still continued to 
create policies in which address these issues. Recently, the United Nations raised issues 
revolving around international cooperation, the evolving threat of foreign terrorist fighters, the 
misuse of new technology by terrorists, and the supporting of member states (Megally, 2018). 
International cooperation should be the focal point of any discussion when terrorism is involved. 
Each country has its own policies on combatting terrorism such as what should be done with a 
returning fighter seeking to reintegrate into society. Whereas some governments revoke 
citizenship, others emphasize rehabilitation and reintegration strategies. Sharing policies might 
offer governments different strategies to prevent and combat terrorism.  
 A major contributor to combatting terrorism within the United Nations has been the 
United States. This might be different by the end of 2019 according to President Donald Trump 
who has announced that the United States will begin withdrawing from Syria in 2019. This is 
due to the “historic victories” seen by the United States in Syria described by President Trump. 
(Specia, 2019). Since the announcement, equipment has been withdrawn from Syria, but there 
have been attacks on American soldiers by ISIS continuing. If the United States continues to 
completely withdrawn from the area, ISIS will fully rise again and judging from the patterns seen 
up to 2016, the organization was never declining and only remained more prominent throughout 
the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.  
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